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Introduction
As of April 2008, 178 countries had signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, committing to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases in an effort to mitigate climate change. Many people believe that the emission reductions of the Kyoto Protocol are not strong enough. Yet, standard economic cost-benefit analysis has difficulties in justifying the emission reductions of the Kyoto Protocol, not to speak about even higher emission reductions. The main reason for the justification problem is the discount rate. The costs of emission reductions are to be paid now, while the mitigation of damages from climate change will be enjoyed in the future and therefore proper cost-benefit analysis requires to discount them. However, the relevant time horizon for climate change damages is hundred years and more. For this reason, standard discount rates lead to dramatic reductions of the present value of damage mitigation and therefore standard cost-benefit analysis hardly ever suggests substantial emission reductions (see e.g. Nordhaus and Yang, 1996, and Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) . Many economists are unsatisfied with this conclusion and believe that standard cost-benefit analysis has to be modified to escape the justification problem of substantial emission reductions. One way out of this dilemma has been suggested in the very influential "Stern Review of the Economics of Climate change" for the British government, released on 30 October 2006, arguing that ethical considerations call for a very low discount rate. However, the justification of a very low discount rate with ethical considerations is heavily criticised by many economists as being paternalistic and disrespectful towards standard literature. Earlier, Yang (2003) , assuming a model with utility from goods consumption and environmental amenities, proposed an alternative justification for the emission reductions of the Kyoto Protocol, namely dual-rate discounting. More specifically, he suggests that environment consumption should be discounted at a lower rate than goods consumption (see also Weitzman (1994) for a similar argument). This is important because standard economic literature usually uses for the value of the consumption discount rate the observed market rate of return to capital. An environmental discount rate could however be lower than this market rate. Applying dual-rate discounting to the RICE model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) , the author confirms that dual-rate discounting can justify the Kyoto Protocol obligations. However, Tol (2003) , though expressing sympathy with Yang's reasoning, has some objections on Yang's methodology. More specifically, Tol objects that in Yang's framework the differential (i.e. the quantitative difference) between the consumption discount rate and the environmental discount rate is not explained within the model, that is, it is not endogenous. As a better alternative, he develops a model in which the marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality might grow with growing income levels. Within this model the differential between the consumption and the environmental discount rate is explained with growth in the marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality. For this reason, Tol recommends a model with fully endogenous dual-rate discounting as the preferred option when the growth rate of the marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality is known. In contrast, when this information is unavailable, then not fully endogenous dual-rate discounting, as in Yang (2003) , might serve as a valid alternative.
In a follow-up paper, Weikard and Zhu (2005) contain in particular the following two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, they show that there is equivalence between use of dual-rate discounting and use of a single consumption discount rate, evaluated in consumption goods equivalents (where, in the latter approach, the evolution of consumption goods equivalents is measured with growth in the marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality).
2 Secondly, they recognised that Tol (2003) implicitly assumes the instantaneous utility function to be additively separable in environment and goods consumption. Relaxing the latter assumption and assuming for simplicity that the marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality is independent of the income level, the authors develop a model in which a rising relative price of environmental goods is the source of growing marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental quality. In related and independent work, Hoel and Sterner (2007) show numerically that under a range of plausible parameter constellations, in a model with the instantaneous utility function being nonseparable in environment and goods consumption, growth in the relative price of environmental goods reduces the value of the environmental discount rate below the value of the conventional consumption discount rate. Furthermore, building on the latter work, Sterner and Persson (2008) show that a rising relative price of environmental goods can justify the drastic level of emission reductions, recommended in the Stern Review. Most importantly, it can do so without reliance on ethical considerations, suggested in the Stern Review, which have been criticised so heavily in the economic literature as being paternalistic and disrespectful towards standard literature. In turn, this brings us back to the motivation of Yang (2003) to propose dual-rate discounting. Weikard and Zhu (2005) further conclude from their analysis that the aforementioned equivalence between use of dual-rate discounting and use of the consumption discount rate (evaluated in consumption goods equivalents) breaks down in case of non-substitutability between environment and goods consumption. This is where the present paper joins the debate. In section 2, the paper shows that the equivalence does actually survive in case of non-substitutability. By showing this result, the paper also provides a clarification that one can distinguish between substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense and substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense, where substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense implies the Hicksian goods demand to be increasing in the relative price of environmental goods, while substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense implies the marginal utility of goods consumption to be decreasing in environment consumption.
Section 3 aims to connect the issue of substitutability to the motivation of Yang (2003) to propose dual-rate discounting for solving the justification problem of substantial emission reductions. As a result of that effort, section 3 shows that the environmental discount rate is lower than the consumption discount rate if environment and goods consumption are not complements in the Hicks-Allen sense (i.e. if the Hicksian goods demand is not decreasing in the relative price of environmental goods). If this condition is fulfilled, then the differential between the consumption discount rate and the environmental discount rate is the larger the lower the value of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period. As a consequence, section 3 challenges to some extent the narrative argument of Neumayer (1999) , who argues that the discount rate debate regarding optimal climate change policy would miss the point, as substitutability rather than discounting would be the real issue. In contrast to Neumayer's argument, the present paper shows that the degree of substitutability between environment and goods consumption affects the size of the environmental discount rate and therefore substitutability and discounting are issues that are closely related to each other.
An alternative way to escape the justification problem of substantial emission reductions is offered by a related literature, arguing that the consumption discount rate declines over time. Most of this literature abstracts from utility from environmental amenities.
3 However, a recent literature uses the same framework as the present paper and investigates whether, due to limited substitutability between environment and goods consumption, economic growth causes the environmental discount rate and the consumption discount rate both to decline over time. In particular, Traeger (2007) challenges the argument of Neumayer (1999) that limited substitutability calls for substantial emission reductions. Traeger shows that instead an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption that is lower than one (implying weak substitutability) implies economic growth to cause over time rising discount rates. However, building on the mathematical framework of Gollier (2008) , Guesnerie (2004) and Hoel and Sterner (2007) , section 4 of the present paper shows that this is only true if environment and goods consumption are complements in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense (which means that the marginal utility of goods consumption is increasing in environment consumption). It is shown that the latter implies the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between composite consumption of different periods to be larger than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period. If one assumes instead environment and goods consumption to be substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense and therefore the aforementioned intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be lower than the aforementioned intratemporal elasticity of substitution, then economic growth causes over time declining discount rates, provided the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than one.
A model with non-substitutability
The starting point of the analysis is the assumption of a simple two-period model in discrete time, with periods 0 and 1. Suppose a project leads to an increase in period 1 goods consumption by ∆ at the expense of a reduction in period 1 environment consumption by ∆ . Further, assume that in case of absence of the assumed project, there would be no growth in environment and goods consumption and that the project is large enough to influence the discount rates. Equivalence between use of dual-rate discounting and use of a single consumption discount rate, evaluated in consumption goods equivalents, implies equivalence of the following two equations: where !' is the net present value of the assumed project, 5 represents the relative price of environmental goods in period 0 (consumption goods being the numéraire) and 5 J denotes the growth rate of this relative price between period 0 and 1. In (1) the !' is calculated, using dual-rate discounting, with the consumption discount rate,
7
, and the environmental discount rate,
. 5 In (2) the NPV is calculated with the single consumption discount rate, 
Weikard and Zhu (2005) argue that a marginal rate of substitution between environment and goods consumption would not exist in case of non-substitutability between environment and goods consumption and therefore in this case the equivalence between (1) and (2) would break down. The latter argument is reconsidered in this paper.
Consider the following CES function of instantaneous utility function with environmental amenities (see Hoel and Sterner, 2007) :
where γ is a constant parameter, σ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period and α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In (4), σ and α are assumed to be constant. Moreover, α can be shown to be the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between composite consumption of different periods, where the composite consumption index of period t=0,1 is defined as:
. As shown in Appendix C, from (4) the consumption discount rate and the environmental discount rate can be derived to be approximately equal to: Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2002, and Hoel and Sterner 2007) .
As is shown in Appendix A, from (4) and a social planner's constraint, the price elasticity of Hicksian goods demand can be derived as:
h E h C p p C where θ denotes the expenditure share of environmental goods and the index h represents Hicksian demand. From (7) follows that environment and goods consumption are not substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense if σ → as in this case the price elasticity of Hicksian goods demand approaches the value zero.
7 In contrast, environment and goods consumption are substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense if 0 > σ and complements in the Hicks-Allen sense if 0 < σ (note however that in (4) the possibility of 0 < σ was excluded, but 0 < σ is possible in case of more general utility functions -getting analytical solutions from more general utility functions is however more difficult). In case σ → (4) approaches the Leontief utility function:
& This is the case Weikard and Zhu (2005) have in mind when they consider nonsubstitutability between environment and goods consumption. However, this is only one case of non-substitutability. In addition, goods consumption and environmental consumption are no substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense if:
The need of approximation is due to the fact that the model is in discrete time. 7 See, e.g., Samuelson (1974 Samuelson ( , page 1256 . 8 See, e.g., Tohamy and Mixon (2003) . 9 See, e.g., Samuelson (1974, page 1256, footnote 2). Related, see also Amano and Wirjanto (1998) . 9 & where the instantaneous utility function is additively separable in environment and goods consumption.
From these exercises it should be clear that the wording non-substitutability and being no substitutes are interchangeable and mean that environment and goods consumption are neither substitutes nor complements. In case of non-substitutability in the Hicks-Allen sense, implying (4) to approach the Leontief utility function, the decision maker is however unwilling to sacrifice some units environment consumption for some additional units goods consumption. In contrast, in case of nonsubstitutability in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense, implying (4) to be reduced to a utility function that is additively separable in environment and goods consumption, the decision maker's utility gain from increase in goods consumption is unaffected from a reduction of environment consumption.
Suppose σ → (that is, suppose non-substitutability in the Hicks-Allen sense) and hence ( ) σ → ∞ . Using the fact that the assumed project implies ∆ > and ∆ < (3), (5), and (6) therefore give rise to:
Hence, when σ → then equation (1) and (2) are equivalent. Since ∆ > and ∆ < in this case, no matter whether the !' is calculated using formula (1) or formula (2), the !' of the assumed project always equals zero. This is due to the fact that the decision maker is unwilling to sacrifice some units environment consumption for some additional units goods consumption. Therefore, the decision maker never goes ahead with the assumed project.
Alternatively, suppose ( )
(that is, suppose non-substitutability in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense). In this case (3), (5) and (6) yield:
Hence, again equation (1) and (2) are equivalent. In this case, the consumption discount rate is independent of the reduction in environment consumption, as is the standard result in the Ramsey model of optimal consumption growth. Analogously, the environmental discount rate is independent of the increase in goods consumption. Nevertheless, the !' is the same no matter whether one uses dualdiscounting or a single consumption discount rate, evaluated in consumption goods equivalents.
3. The role of substitutability for the discount rate differential
The purpose of this section is to bring us back to the motivation of Yang (2003) to propose dual-rate discounting, namely to ask whether or not the paper's model provides conditions under which substantial emission reductions to mitigate climate change can be justified. Since in the last section's model the project implied changes of environment and goods consumption in the same period, the model could not approximate cost-benefit analysis of future climate change. Doing so requires a slight change of the model assumptions. For this purpose, assume now a T period model and assume that a project leads to a reduction of period 0 goods consumption by ∆ and to an increase in period T environment consumption by ∆ . This approximates in a simple way current abatement costs from emission reductions and future mitigation of damages from climate change. Contrary to the last sections model, in this section's model it is assumed that the project is so small that it cannot influence the discount rates. Using dual-rate discounting, the project's !' is now: J denotes the growth rate of the relative price of environmental goods from period t-1 to period t. From (3') follows (after use of the fact that + ≅ ln(1 ) x x , since x is close to zero):
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Noting that, as mentioned before, efficient allocation requires that = = , / , t t t t t E C E C p MRS U U using (4), straightforward calculation yields: for any variable ; (and now use was made of 1 x' ) ln(x' − ≅ , since x'-1 is close to zero).
Eq. (10) shows that, provided ( ) ( )
C C E E then σ ≥ 0 ensures a rising relative price of environmental goods (i.e. then environment and goods consumption not to be complements in the Hicks-Allen sense, cf. (7), ensures a rising relative price of environmental goods). Therefore (3') implies, in this case, the environmental discount rate to be smaller than the consumption discount rate. Moreover, (10) and (3') imply that, provided σ ≥ 0 , then the difference between the value of the consumption discount rate and the value of the environmental discount rate is the larger, the smaller σ, that is the weaker substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense environment and goods consumption are.
To better understand the mechanisms at work, assume for simplicity that
In this case, upon use of (5) and (6) the discount rates become: for any variable ; . According to the first equation of (5'), growth in goods consumption unambiguously increases − 9 9 7 , while according to (6') the impact of growth in goods consumption on
). Most importantly, the second equation in (5') and (6') imply for the discount rate differential that we have The bottom line of this exercise is that dual-rate discounting might offer an escape from the justification problem of substantial emission reductions if environment and goods consumption are weak substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense. Therefore, the aforementioned narrative argument of Neumayer (1999) is challenged with the analytical result that weak substitutability might actually be reflected in a larger discount rate differential.
4. The role of substitutability for the change of discount rates over time Traeger (2007) argues that weak substitutability in the Hicks-Allen sense (i.e. σ < ) implies over time rising discount rates. With this he challenges the argument of Neumayer (1999) that weak substitutability calls for substantial emission reductions. However, Traeger 's result is driven by his seemingly innocent assumption, in the instantaneous utility function, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, , α to be equal to zero. To show this point, assume the same model as in the last section (i.e. with the !' calculated according to (9) and the project being so small that it cannot influence the discount rates). Assuming 0, α = upon use of (5) and (6) the discount rates become:
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As shown in Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2002) , when ( ) ( )
the value share of environmental goods,γ * t , increases if environment and goods consumption are weak substitutes in the Hicks-Allen sense, i.e. if σ < 1 (see also Hoel and Sterner, 2007, and Guesnerie, 2004) . As argued in Traeger, C C g which gives upon use of (5) and (6) the discount rates as: In turn, using (5"'), (6"') and (11) it is straightforward to derive that:
Obviously, (12) and (13) (12) and (13) show that, provided σ < 1 (i.e. provided the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption is smaller than one), then both discount rates only rise if ( )
, that is if environment and goods consumption are complements in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense (cf. (8) assumption, as this implies risk neutral consumers, while it seems more realistic to assume risk avers consumers. As (12) and (13) show, in case σ < 1, if instead
, that is if instead environment and goods consumption are substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense (cf (8)), then both discount rates decline. In turn, eq. (8) implies that environment and goods consumption are substitutes in the EdgeworthPareto sense if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between composite consumption of different periods is lower than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period.
The bottom line of this section is that, for the direction of the change of the discount rates over time, it is relative weak intertemporal substitutability that matters rather than relative weak intratemporal substitutability. This makes also intuitively sense, as declining discount rates is an intertemporal change. Clearly, the policy implication is that relatively weak intertemporal substitutability can also contribute to justify substantial emission reductions.
Conclusion
Recent literature on cost-benefit analysis of climate change suggests dual-rate discounting, where goods consumption is discounted with a consumption discount rate and environment consumption is discounted with an environmental discount rate. The motivation for dual-rate discounting is to justify substantial emission reductions, as possibly in this framework the environmental discount rate might be lower than the consumption discount rate and possibly in a model with endogenous dual-rate discounting both discount rates might decline over time. The present study showed that, provided environment and goods consumption are not complements in the Hicks-Allen sense, then the environmental discount rate is lower than the consumption discount rate (not complements in the Hicks-Allen sense implies the Hicksian goods demand not to be decreasing in the relative price of environmental goods). Further, if environment and goods consumption are not complements in the Hicks-Allen sense, then the quantitative difference between the consumption discount rate and the environmental discount rate is the larger, the lower the value of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period. In addition, the present paper showed that, provided the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period is lower than one, then environment and goods consumption to be substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense ensures both discount rates to decline over time (substitutes in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense implies the marginal utility of goods consumption to be decreasing in environment consumption). Moreover, it is shown that environment and goods consumption are substitutes in the EdgeworthPareto sense if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between composite consumption of different periods is lower than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between environment and goods consumption within a period.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Derivation of eq. (7) The price elasticity of Hicksian consumption demand can be derived in three steps.
Step 1: Derive the instantaneous expenditure function.
Step 2: Derive the Hicksian goods demand function upon application of Shepard's lemma to the instantaneous expenditure function.
Step 3: Derive the price elasticity of Hicksian goods demand.
Step 1: Derivation of the instantaneous expenditure function Suppose a social planner has to solve the following two period optimisation problem:
. 6
Hence, the social planner maximises life-time utility, V, subject to goods consumption constraints in period 0 and 1 and an intertemporal constraint of environment consumption. Physical capital can be used for output production, Y. Physical capital and output can be transformed into consumption goods. The sum of physical capital and output that has not been consumed in period 0 equals the physical capital stock at the begin of period 1, . In period 1, the physical capital stock and all output is entirely consumed. For simplicity neither labour nor natural resources are used in production. The economy's initial stock of natural resources, $ is assumed to be consumed by household's as environmental amenities.
Setting a Lagrangian gives rise to the following first order conditions: 
Since the instantaneous expenditure function for period 1 is the inverse of the indirect instantaneous utility function, (A.8) implies the instantaneous expenditure function for period 1 to be:
Step 2 Step 3: Derivation of the price elasticity of Hicksian goods demand
Calculating the price elasticity from (A.11) gives eq. (7) (5) and (6) in the text.
